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MUSLIM ORGANIZATIONS IN SINGAPORE: AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

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INTRODUCTION

The Muslim community in Singapore is a minority community. According to the 1990 census, 15.4 percent of the total population were Muslims. It has been suggested that although censuses conducted during the last century have not consistently recorded statistics on religious affiliation, the Singaporean Muslim minority has most probably constituted about 15 percent of the population during the last 100 years.[1] The Muslim community in Singapore is also ethnically complex. It is made up of Malays, Indians, Arabs, Chinese, and other ethnic groups. According to the 1990 census, part of the 0.3 percent (categorised as other religions) of the Chinese community, 99.6 percent of the Malay community, 27.0 percent of the Indian community and 24.7 percent of the "Other Ethnic Groups" were recorded as Muslims.[2] It is clear from the statistics that the Muslim community is dominated, in terms of numbers, by the Malays, who comprise 85.3 percent of the total Singaporean Muslim population.[3] It is significant to note at the very outset that this ethnic complexity holds the key to understanding the dynamics of this Muslim minority in historical perspective. This is because though the Indian Muslims and the Arabs (generally recorded under "Other Ethnic Groups") are in the minority among the Muslim community, they had, for quite sometime, provided the community with both its socio-economic elite as well as its religious and political leadership.

A Muslim organization in the context used in this paper refers to an organization that has Islam or Muslim in its name and whose activities are for the betterment of the Muslims. This difinition of a Muslim Organization took into consideration the proliferation of organizations among the ethnic groups of the Singapore Muslims. Organizations without Islam or Muslims in their names seem to concentrate their activities mostly along ethnic and/or professional lines.

The main text of this write-up is divided into five sequential parts according to the historical evolution of modern Singapore. It begins with the pre-colonial era, that is, the period before 1819, and the last part starts from the

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period of independence, 1965. In between, are the colonial era 1819–1958, the period of internal self-governance 1959–1963, and the period of merger with Malaysia 1963–1965. In this write-up, emphasis is placed on developments as they affected Muslims and how the Muslims responded as well as the channel(s) through which they responded. This is with a view to tracing the historical background of Muslim organizations.

THE PERIOD BEFORE 1819

It is significant to state at the outset that prior to the foundation of modern Singapore in 1819, the area was part of the Johore-Riau-Lingga empire under a Sultan whose subordinate, a Temenggong, looked after Johore and the Islands of what came to be modern Singapore. Muslim traders (particularly Arabs and Indians) are said to have played a prominent role in the introduction of Islam to this area, just like in the larger Malay Archipelago.[4] In an interview with *The Muslim World League Journal*, Hj Abu Bakr Maidin, President of Jamiyah Muslim Missionary Society said that Islam came to Singapore a few hundred years ago and it was brought by some Arabs and Indian traders.[5] Stressing the Indian factor while writing about Tamil Muslims in Singapore, Mani[6] said that the Tamil Muslims[7] originated from Tamil Nadu in Southern India and for hundreds of years they have been leaving India in order to pursue opportunities in Southeast Asia. The Muslims living in the area of modern Singapore just before its foundtion, were those Muslims who were with Temenggong Abdur Rahman, who governed the country of Singapore and all its islands, with whom Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles (1781–1826) signed a treaty on the 30th of January 1819 for the foundation of modern Singapore. The exact number of Muslims living in Singapore at the time of its foundation in 1819 is difficult to ascertain. Earlier statistics were based on ethnicity, and even then there seems to be no unanimity as to the precise number of Malays (the bulk of the Muslim population) living in Singapore in 1819. According to Wilson[8] and Foon,[9] there were about a hundred Malay fishing folk and a small number of about thirty Chinese when Raffles landed in 1819. Li[10] states that the Malays numbered a few hundred at the time of Raffles' arrival. According to a National Situation Report on Singapore during the 1977 Asian Muslim Youth Seminar on *Da'wah*, it was reported that when Raffles arrived at Singapore in 1819, there were about one hundred and fifty Malays (presumably Muslims) living on the Island.[11] One thing is clear from these accounts that the Malays found the bulk of the population at the time of Singapore's foundation in 1819. This was the situtation up to 1824 when out of the 10,687 population, 4,580 or almost 50% were Malays, 1,925 Bugis, 3,317 Chinese, 756 Indians, 74 Europeans, 15 Armenians and 15 Arabs.[12] However, the Chinese had by 1830 become the largest ethnic component of the population with 53%[13] and swelled to 65% of the population by 1867 when they numbered 55,000.[14] Thus, apart from postulating that the Muslims were living under the guidance of the office of the Temenggong, it is difficult to think of the existence of a Muslim organization at that time. This was, however, to change with the foundation of modern Singapore which was

followed by waves of immigrants that included Muslims. Thus, apart from those Muslims who were with the Temenggong, all other Muslims, just like the Chinese and Indians who flocked to Singapore after its foundation, came as migrants.[15]

THE COLONIAL ERA: 1819–1958

Modern Singapore owes its foundation to colonialism. It was the struggle for possession of territories as well as for the monopoly and control of international trade between the Dutch and the British in the Malay Archipelago that culminated in the foundation of Singapore.[16] The preliminary treaty which Raffles concluded with the Temenggong in January 1819 was formally ratified when on the 6th of February 1819, a formal treaty was entered by Sir Thomas Raffles for the East India Company on the one part and Sultan Hussein and Temenggong Abdur Rahman on the other part. Hussein was the elder son of late Sultan Mahmud Riayat Shah of Johore-Riau-Lingga empire who died in Lingga in January 1812. Raffles sent for Hussein from Riau and recognised him as the Sultan of Johore because he felt that the settlement was unsafe under a pro-Dutch Sultan, that is referring to Hussein's younger brother Abdur Rahman Muadzam Shah who was proclaimed Sultan (to succeed his father) by the Bugis with the support of the Dutch. In 1824, the Sultan and the Temenggong signed the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance with the East India Company which led to the outright accession of Singapore and all its islands to the British.

The descent of the Muslim majority in Singapore into a minority status with its attendant consequences on the one hand, and the crisis of leadership on the other, characterised the greater part of the history of the Singapore Muslims during the colonial era. In response to such phenomena, some Muslim organizations were formed and strove to address the problems.

The present situation in which the Muslims find themselves as a minority in Singapore, is the aftermath of a century and half of the colonial era. Although waves of Chinese immigration into Singapore could also be linked to the harsh conditions in China,[17] the colonial state encouraged the Chinese to immigrate for being most suitable[18] and for long the immigration was not controlled. Even when monthly quota[19] was for the first time imposed in 1932 (and for men only), individuals and companies were given permission by the colonial state to recruit labourers outside the quota and bring them to Singapore. Numerically, therefore, the long unrestricted immigration[20] resulted in the dwarfing of the original Muslim population,[21] as most of the immigrants were non-Muslims. Economically, the immigrants because of the circumstances surrounding their migration, engaged in all types of human activities and considered the acquisition of wealth to be one of the most essential aims in life, almost an end in itself. As a result, they were said to be indefatigable workers and keen businessmen while those who migrated as unskilled, metamorphosed in the second generation and started with a higher standard of living with many of them penetrating into the skilled labour field and the free profession, creating

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thereby a vacuum in the unskilled labourers which was filled for the most part by the natives.[22]

The most significant feature of the Singapore Muslim community from the early days was the lack of indigenous traditional leadership. The traditional aristocratic leadership examplified in the persons of the Sultan and the Temenggong declined with their deaths, after the first few decades of colonialism.[23] But even before their deaths, it is significant to state that their positions were reduced to insignificance by the colonial state. In signing the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, for instance, pressure and coercion (such as withholding allowances) was exerted by the British on the rulers. As a result, the treaties concluded by the British and the rulers were seen by some scholars as dubious.[24] In 1823, the Sultan and the Temenggong were relieved from further personal attendance at the court which sat every Monday in order to listen to petitions and queries and to decide on the substance of proclamations.[25] Earlier in the previous year, the colonial state had refused to accede to the Sultan's request to hand over to him the dead body of Sayid Yasin, an Arab Muslim, who was shot dead following an incident. Instead, the body was carried around the town in a bullock cart and then hung up on display for a fortnight in an iron cage at Telok Ayer.[26]

For quite sometime and as the influence of the traditional aristocratic leadership waned, the Arabs, Jawi Peranakans and Malay-Arabs[27] provided leadership to the Singapore Muslim community.[28] This leadership was appealing not on the basis of ethnic identities but on the basis of religion (Islam) and language (the Malay language). The acceptance of the Arabs and the Jawi Peranakans as leaders by the Muslim community could be attributed to two main factors.[29] The first was their knowledge of Islam especially the Arabs for having come from the land that gave rise to Islam. The second factor was their wealth and better education. Highly sensitive to the disadvantaged position of the Malayo-Muslim community, this new leadership urged for the formation of modern community organizations aimed at unification, solidarity and social exchange along religious and linguistic lines. The principal institution through which the authority of this leadership was expressed, within the Malayo-Muslim community itself, was the Persekutuan Islam Singapura (Muslim Association of Singapore) which was founded around 1900.[30] Thus, it can be noted that this Muslim Association which was formed by a leadership that was appealing on the basis of religion, aimed at addressing the disadvantaged position of the Malayo-Muslim community and hence stressed the need for unity, solidarity and social exchange. It is pertinent, therefore, to explain another aspect of the disadvantaged position of the Malayo-Muslims in order to appreciate the concern of the Muslim Association.[31]

Colonial treatment of education is regarded by many scholars as the root of the socio-economic dislocation of the Muslims and the Malays in particular. In a number of articles, Ahmad[32] attributed the problem of Malay education to British colonial policy which served in retarding the Malay education by making it purely for the purpopses of preserving the Malay

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traditional life, ensuring that the Malay peasant did not get ideas above his status. Zoohri[33] noted that the British colonial policy had much to be blamed tor aggravating the economic deprivation of the Malays as the educational policy was that of only providing primary vernacular education to the Malays. According to Roff,[34] the vernacular education even as revised by R.O. Winstedt was eminently suited to a people whose future lay in peasant agriculture and fitted them for very little else. According to Siddique and Kassim,[35] since the vernacular education was rather motivated to keep them down, it was not surprising that the Malays were reluctant to invest in such education for their children. Hussain[36] noted that it was the educational pattern that largely withheld the Malays from entering into the competitive economic arena and civil service. Besides that, the British colonial authorities provided few opportunities for the Malays to study English. This, according to Fong,[37] is one of the reasons that explains the economic backwardness of the Malays in Singapore.

For about half a century (from about 1870 to the early 1920s), the Arabs and the Jawi Peranakans provided leadership to the Muslim community. During that period, they saw themselves and were seen as the natural spokesmen for the Islamic community as a whole and played the role of intermediaries between the Muslim community and the British rulers.[38] However, the early 1920s saw the beginning of a division between the Malays on the one hand, and the Arabs and Jawi Peranakans on the other. This marked the beginning of an era of ethnic polarisation within the Muslim community when ethnicity was more emphasised. This could be said to be the culmination of a number of factors. There was an emerging political self-consciousness or ethnic nationalism among the Malays.[39] This emerging political self consciousness cannot be unrelated to the happenings within the larger Singapore society as it affected the Malays and their relations with the Arabs. The Malays had felt concerned at the way in which, as land values in the municipality rose, they had been bought out of the areas originally leased to and built on by them in and around Kampong Glam and were forced either to seek substandard rental housing in scattered parts of the same area or to move out to the fringes of the city.[40] This situation was said to be at the root of many Malay grievances against the Arabs, into whose hands much of the previously Malay property had fallen.[41] Although economic rivalry or antipathy arising out of other sorts of situational disadvantage played a part in the Malay resentment to the Arabs and Jawi Peranakans, it seems that the political self-consciousness on the part of the former played a significant role. Roff notes:

> It was more basically symptomatic of the fundamental problem of self-recognition facing the Malay in the plural society, of discovering himself and then retaining his identity amid the plethora of alien cultural forces which had increasingly pressed upon him during the past half century.[42]

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The division within the Muslim community led to the formation of an association, Muslim Institute, in 1921 which is said to have barred from membership the descendants of Arabs or Indians.[43] This position of the Muslims along the two divides came to a sharp open regarding the appointment of additional Asian representative in the Straits Settlements Legislative Council as decided by the government in 1921. The Muslim Association was said to have wanted a specifically Muslim representative while the Muslim Institute was said to have wanted a Malay. The British appointed Eunos Abdullah, a Malay, to the position and he took his seat in the Council in 1924. It is said that it was consequent upon this appointment and the need felt by the Malays to provide Eunos with organizational support, that resulted in the formation in 1926, of the first Malay association with explicit political aims, the Kesatuan Melayu Singapura (KMS) or Singapore Malay Union.[44] Eunos, therefore, became the first Singapore Malay to be appointed as a member of the Straits Settlements Legislative Council. He was active in articulating the interests of the Singapore Malay community to the British authorities to the extent of eventually becoming, in the words of Roff, "the accepted leader of Singapore's Malay community".[45] From then onwards, Malay political associations began playing leading roles as platforms for championing the cause of the Malay Muslims.[46]

In 1931, a Muslim religious organization was formed. This was the All-Malaya Muslim Missionary Society.[47] It was formed on the initiative of Mawlana Muhammad Abdul Aleem Siddiqui Al Qadiri (who arrived in Singapore in 1928 from India). It aimed at broadening the Islamic knowledge of the Muslims and by so doing enlighten the non-Muslims as to what is Islam.[48] Its activities at the time centred on conducting religious classes and lectures, conversion services,[49] etc. At a conference which it organised and hosted in 1949, a number of resolutions affecting the Muslims were passed.[50] The Society also concerned itself with the question of religious unity and harmony. Through a series of meetings in January and February 1949 with officials of the colonial state on the issue, an Inter Religious Organization (IRO) was formed in order to maintain religious harmony and to spread moral virtues.[51]

During the Japanese occupation, major activities of Muslim organizations appeared to have declined. This could most probably be due to the war that followed the occupation. In the case of All-Malaya Muslim Missionary Society, for instance, its activities had to cease functioning. Its moderate building which was erected in 1932 was hit and destroyed by a bomb during the war. It was, however, rebuilt after the occupation and officially opened on the 9th of January 1949.[52]

Towards the closing years of colonialism, ideas of Islamic modernism from Indonesia and Egypt were making their impact on the Muslims of Singapore. As a result, some Muslims began to feel concern about the cultural onslaught of imperialism and the religious decadence of the Muslims. This is said to be the genesis for the formation of Muhammadiyah (followers of Muhammad, peace be upon him), an Islamic organization in Singapore in 1957.[53] It is concerned with a return to pure monotheism (*tawhīd*) on the basis

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of Qur'ān and the *Sunnah*; to combat form(s) of religious innovations (*bid'ah*); and emphasise that religion and the dynamics of society are inseparable, in Islam. It seeks to realize its objectives through religious reformation, social change and Islamic education.[54]

To this end, it can be said that during the colonial era, the greater part of the history of the Singapore Muslims was characterised by the transformation of the Muslims from a majority to a minority status on the one hand, and the crisis of leadership on the other. Muslim organizations, whose roots can be linked to internal and external influences, were formed to address the problems which the Muslim community was facing.

PERIOD OF INTERNAL SELF-GOVERNANCE: 1959-1963

On the larger Singaporean society, this period was characterised by the struggle with the communists, the struggle to gain control over the trade union movement, and campaign for merger with Malaysia. The first two played themselves out almost completely on the Chinese (majority) political stage. Siddique and Kassim[55] note that although the ultimate consequences were certainly important for the minorities, they participated only peripherally in the drama, adding to the settling of unrest and the creation of more jobs benefiting all Singaporeans.

The campaign for merger with Malaysia was said to be initiated by the leaders of People's Action Party (PAP), a Chinese dominated party which came to power in 1959. The PAP leadership wanted to achieve independence through merger with the Federation of Malaya (with Malay majority), it was felt that this was likely to be unsuccessful if the role of the Malays in Singapore was ignored. Consequently, positive and far reaching measures particularly towards improving the Malays educational position were taken by the PAP.[56]

Meanwhile Muslim orgnizations also continued to address, among other things, the problems of their educational backwardness. Tuition programmes were organised and in a meeting of Muslim organizations at Jamiyah in June 1963, Prophet Muhammad's (peace be upon him) Birthday Memorial Donation Committee[57] was set up in order to raise funds to be used to provide financial assistance to deserving Muslim students to pursue their studies.[58]

At a pre-merger meeting in August 1961, it is reported that the Prime Ministers of the Federation of Malaya and Singapore agreed on a model to be adopted by Singapore regarding the administration of Islam.[59] The model was as applicable in the former Straits Settlements of Malacca and Penang in which "the Yang di-Pertuan Agong will be the head of the Muslim religion in Singapore and that a Council of Muslim Religion will be established to advise the Yang di-Pertuan Agong in matters relating to the Muslim religion".[60] This agreement is important to note as it held sway in the future administration of Islam and the relations between the state and Muslim organizations.

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PERIOD OF MERGER WITH MALAYSIA: 1963–1965

When the Federation of Malaysia agreement came to effect in 1963, the agreement on the administration of Islam in respect to the position of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, was duly included in the Singapore constitution.[61]

The brief period of the merger, perhaps marked the only time when the Malayo-Muslim minority in Singapore was in the centre stage of political events. During the period, they were no longer a minority but part of the larger Malaysian Malay Muslim community of the Federation. The Malayo-Muslim community of Singapore continued to enjoy the special educational assistance provided by the government. Some Malay and Muslim organizations especially those with explicit political aims such as the Singapore Malays National Organization (SMNO) were calling for the introduction of special privileges for the Malays.[62] The call was rejected by the government. Some Muslims were also opposed to the granting of special privileges to the Malays and opined that such will prevent them from endeavouring to raise themselves to a position of equality with other races.[63]

There occurred in Singapore in 1964, a riot in the course of a procession marking the celebration of *Mawlid* (the birthday of the Prophet peace be upon him). According to Jamiyah, whose premises used to be the starting point of the annual procession marking the *Mawlid* celebration, the riot "was reportedly provoked by unknown and irresponsible persons".[64] From then wards, no procession was permitted during *Mawlid* celebrations. Although the agreement regarding the administration of Islam in Singapore with respect to the position of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong was duly included in the Singapore constitution, the Muslim Religious Council was not constituted throughout the period of the merger.

PERIOD OF INDEPENDENCE: FROM 1965

It was after the separation of Singapore from Malaysia[65] that the Administration of Muslim Law Act was passed by the Singapore parliament which paved the way for constituting the Muslim Religious Council known as Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura (MUIS) charged with regulating the administration of Muslim law. A number of reasons could be attributed to the setting up of MUIS now. According to Kassim, government decided to set up MUIS partly to satisfy the demands of Muslim organizations and partly for its own interests.[66] Hussain, on the other hand, said that the council was created in order to contain Malay extremism and religious fanaticism.[67] In any case, the setting up of MUIS, is to be seen against the background of the major concern of the Singapore state at the time. Following the separation, the Singapore state entered into an era of survival and national integration. Although the Malay-Muslims are now a minority, they have acquired a new status. As Chee pointed out, they are now a crucial minority who should be given special attention because the Singapore Republic is surrounded by a sea of Malay people.[68] In terms of national integration, which in a very real sense focuses on loyalties, the Malays stood to be given special attention because, as Bedlington noted, if the Malays continue

to see themselves as not sharing equally in the national development, or if they see their ethnic identity in danger of being completely submerged, they will extend their loyalties outwards, beyond the territorial boundaries of Singapore.[69] It can also be added, as Siddique pointed out, that the riot which broke out in the course of the *Mawlid* celebration, underscored the need to defuse a politically volatile situation through the institutionalization of Islam in the newly independent republic.[70] Thus, it can be said that it was a combination of the above factors that led to the creation of MUIS. With the establishment of the council, no Muslim religious activity can be carried out without its permission.[71] Furthermore, the establishment of MUIS requires all converts to Islam to register with the council.[72]

During the first decade of Singapore's independence, especially in the 1970s, there was a growing concern among some Muslims on the restrictive nature of *da'wah*. Salleh and Abdullah, for instance, noted that the then existing Islamic activities were more interested in maintaining rather than expanding the Muslim population and that more Islamic organizations were bound by their 'Malay' feeling rather than 'Islam' feeling.[73] As a result of this, and in order also to look into the welfare and development of Muslim converts, a pioneer group of converts got together in 1976 and resulted in the formation of Muslim Converts' Association which was officially registered in 1980.[74] Its mission is to promote Islam through total *da'wah* approach; to look after the welfare and developments of converts; and to promote universal Islamic brotherhood.

The problem of Muslims educational backwardness continued to receive attention. In 1981, a number of Muslim organizations with the support of the Singapore government, set up MENDAKI,[75] a council for the education of Muslim children. Since its formation, MENDAKI, has been conducting tuition programmes and awarding bursaries and educational loans, among other educational activities.[76] Zoohri, however, noted that going by the reliance of MENDAKI on the voluntary services of professionals, the council lacks the sustained push and drive to initiate more and better programmes for the community.[77]

As Singapore entered the third decade of its independence, emphasis was placed by the state on high technology for the information age. Concerned about the state of Muslims, lagging behind and not taking their right place in the scheme of things, and also with the surface approach of addressing the problem, a group of Muslim professionals got together and formed the Association of Muslim Professionals which was registered in 1991. The mission of the Association is to play a leading role in the development and long term transformation of the Muslim community in Singapore into a dynamic community taking its pride of place in the larger Singaporean society. In a recent study on the Factors Affecting Malay/Muslim Pupils' Performance in Education, the Association noted that the tuition programmes which Malay/Muslim organizations are conducting as a strategy to tackle the problem of under-achievement amongst Malay/Muslim pupils, is merely treating the symptoms of the problem as it does not address the problem of unsatisfactory

home environment, negative personality characteristics, lack of quality parental care and family disorganization which have strong influences on academic success.[78]

CONCLUSION

An understanding of the convergence of internal and external influences is a key factor in tracing the genesis, objectives and activities of Muslim organizations in Singapore. This is important as it will, in historical perspective, show the state of Islamisation in Singapore.

[1]S. Siddique and Y.R. Kassim, "Muslim Society, Higher Education and Development: The Case of Singapore", in S. Ahmad and S. Siddique (eds.), *Muslim Society, Higher Education and Development in Southeast Asia* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1987), p. 128.

[2]*Singapore Census of Population 1990*, Statistical Release No. 6, Table 3.

[3]*Singapore 1995* (Singapore: Ministry of Information and Arts), p. 33.

[4]Various theories and explanations have been offered by scholars with regard to the introduction of Islam to the Malay Archipelago. See for instance, J.A.E. Morley, "The Arabs and the Eastern Trade", *Journal Malayan Branch Royal Asiatic Society*, (henceforth referred to as *JMBRAS*), Vol. xxii, part 1, 1949; G.R. Tibbetts, "Early Muslim Traders in Southeast Asia", *JMBRAS*, Vol. xxx, 1957; A.H. Johns, "Sufism as a Category in Indonesian Literature and History", *Journal of Southeast Asian History*, Vol. ii, 1961; C.A. Majul, "Theories on the Introduction and Expansion of Islam in Malaysia", in *Proceedings of the Second Biennial Conference of the International Association of Historians of Asia* (Taiwan: 1962); S.Q. Fatimi, *Islam Comes to Malaysia* (Singapore: Malaysian Sociological Research Institute, 1963); A. Muhammad, *A Brief History of Islam with Special Reference to Malaya* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1963); S.M.N. Al-Attas, *Preliminary Statement on a General Theory of Islamisation of the Malay-Indonesian Archipelago* (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1969).

[5]*The Muslim World League Journal*, Vol. xx, No. 2, August 1992, p. 11.

[6]A Mani, "Aspects of Identity and Change Among Tamil Muslims in Singapore", *Journal Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs*, Vol. xiii, No. 2, 1992, p. 337. See also, K.S. Sandhu, *Indians in Malaya* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), pp. 119-123; N.J. Ryan, *The Making of Modern Malaysia: A History from Earliest Times to 1969* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1967); S. Arasaratnam, *Indians in Malaysia and Singapore* (London: Oxford University Press, 1970).

[7]"The Tamil Muslims form the majority among Indian Muslims in Singapore". See Mani, *op. cit.*, p. 338.

[8]H.E. Wilson, *Social Engineering in Singapore: Educational Policies and Social Change 1819-1972* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1978), p. 5.

[9]C.S. Foon, *Ethnicity and Nationality in Singapore* (Athens: Centre for International Studies, Ohio University, 1987), p. 24.

[10]T. Li, *Malays in Singapore: Culture, Economy, and Ideology* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 93.

[11]*Report on the Asian Muslim Youth Seminar on Da'wah* (Kuala Lumpur: February 1977), p. 144.

[12]W.H. Hanna, "The Malays Singapore part 1: The Feudal Past", *Southeast Asian Series*, Vol. xiv, No. 2, quoted in C.H. Chee, *Singapore: The Politics of Survival* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 16. But the Singapore Ministry of Information and Arts gives the population as 10,683 with the following statistics: Malays 60%, Chinese 31% and Indians 7%. See *Singapore 1995, op. cit*, p. 30.

[13]Chee, *Ibid.*

[14]*Singapore 1995, op. cit.*

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[15]S. Siddique, "Administration of Islam in Singapore", in T. Abdullah and S. Siddique (eds.), *Islam and Society in Southeast Asia* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1986), p. 317.

[16]For accounts of Singapore's founding and peopling, see for instance, C.M. Turnbull. *A History of Singapore 1819–1975* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 1–127; H.E. Wilson, *Social Engineering in Singapore: Educational Policies and Social Change 1819–1972* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1978), pp. 1–28; C.S. Foon, *op. cit.*, pp. 19–27.

[17]For the reasons of Chinese migration, see J. Ee, "Chinese Migration to Singapore 1896–1941", *Journal of Southeast Asian History*, Vol. ii, 1961, pp. 33–51.

[18]This was argued to be the result of the Malays abstaining from hired labour which was considered antithesis in making capital investment profitable. See Ee, *op. cit.*, p. 35; Z. Abramowitz, "The Economies of Asian Minorities", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Vol. xxiv, No. 22, May 29, 1958, p. 675.

[19]Initially it was 1,000 immigrants monthly and later varied between 6,000 and 500 monthly. See Ee, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

[20]A.M. Ibrahim, *The Legal Status of the Muslims in Singapore* (Singapore: Malayan Law Journal Limited, 1965), p. 5.

[21]A.M. Kettani, *Muslim Minorities in the World Today* (London: Mensell Publishing Ltd., 1986), p. 152.

[22]Ee, *op. cit.*, p. 49; Abramowitz, *op. cit.*, p. 675; J. Djamour, *Malay Kingship and Marriage in Singapore* (London: The Athlone Press, 1965), p. 10; W. Neville, "Singapore: Ethnic Diversity and its Implications", *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, Vol. lvi, No. 2, 1966, p. 252.

[23]Siddique, *op. cit.*, p. 317; I. Kassim, *Problems of Elite Cohesion: A Perspective from a Minority Community* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1974), p. 41.

[24]Foon, *op. cit.*, p. 23; Turnbull, *op. cit.*, p. 30; C.H. Chee, *op cit.*, p. 16.

[25]Ibrahim, *op. cit.*, pp. 1–2.

[26]For more information about the incidence involving Sayid Yasin, see Turnbull, *op. cit.*, p. 25; Morley, *op. cit.*, p. 166; S.H. Alatas, *Thomas Stamford Raffles 1781–1826: Schemer or Reformer?* (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1971), p. 33.

[27]The term 'Jawi Peranakan' or 'local born Muslim', was used to denote the offspring of South Indian Muslims and Malay women and their descendants. Malay-Arabs were the offspring of the marriage between Arabs and Malay women and their descendants. See W.R. Roff, "The Malayo-Muslim World of Singapore at the close of the Nineteenth century", *Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. xxiv, 1964, pp. 81 and 86; W.R. Roff, *The Origins of Malay Nationalism* (Kuala Lumpur: Penerbit Universiti Malaya, 1974), pp. 48–49; Siddique, *op. cit.*, p. 318.

[28]Siddique, *op. cit.*, Roff, *op. cit.*, pp. 181 and 188.

[29]*Siddique, op. cit.*, p. 188; Kassim, *op. cit.*, pp. 41–42.

[30]Roff, *op. cit.*, p. 181.

[31]Reference has already been made to the descent of the Muslim majority to a minority status, as well as the economic preponderance of the Chinese.

[32]See for instance his following articles, "Singapore Malays, Education and National Development", *Suara Universiti*, Vol. ii, 1971, pp. 41–45; "Singapore Malays, Education and National Development", in S. Ahmad and J. Wong (eds.), *Malay Participation in the National Development of Singapore* (Singapore: Central Council of Malay Cultural Organizations and Community Study Centre, 1971), pp. 6–8; "University Education in Singapore: The Dilemma of the Malay-medium Educated", in Y.Y. Hoong (ed.), *Development of Higher Education in Southeast Asia* (Singapore: Regional Institute of Higher Education and Development, 1973), pp. 166–169.

[33]W.H. Zoohri, *The Singapore Malays: The Dilemma of Development* (Singapore: Kesatuan Guru-Guru Melayu Singapura, 1990), p. 7.

[34]Roff, *op. cit.*, pp. 140–141.

[35]Siddique and Kassim, *op. cit.*, p. 131.

[36]A. Husain, "The Post-Separation Effect on the Singapore Malays and Their Response: 1965–1966", *Journal of the Historical Society*, University of Singapore, 1970, p. 68.

[37]P.E. Fong, "The Economic Status of Malay Muslims in Singapore". *Journal Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs*, Vol. iii, No. 2, 1981, p. 150.

[38]Kassim, *op. cit.*, p. 42; Roff, *op. cit.*, p. 188.

[39]The reasons for which the Arabs and the Jawi Peranakans were accepted as leaders (namely, their having come from the land that gave rise to Islam, and their wealth), were still very much valid.

[40]Roff, *op. cit.*, p. 192.

[41]Morley, *op. cit.*, p. 170.

[42]Roff, *op. cit.*, p. 245.

[43]Mani, *op. cit.*, p. 354.

[44]Kassim, *op. cit.*, p. 42; Roff, *op. cit.*, p. 190.

[45]Roff, *op. cit.*, p. 161.

[46]See for instance Zoohri, *op. cit.*, pp. 14–26; Kassim, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

[47]This name was later changed to Jamiyah Muslim Missionary Society.

[48]*Jamiyah Singapore: 60th Anniversary*, p. 72; *World Muslim League Journal*, May 1981, p. 54.

[49]In 1940, the Association converted a total of 300 Chinese to Islam. See M. Yegar, *Islam and Islamic Institutions in British Malaya: Policies and Implementation* (Jerusalem: The Magness Press, 1979), p. 103.

[50]See *60th Anniversary*, *op. cit.*, p. 75 for the resolutions.

[51]*Ibid.*

[52]*50th Anniversary of Jamiyah*, Jamiyah, Singapore, 1985, p. 22.

[53]*Muhammadiyah: The Organisation* (Singapore: Publication Department, Muhammadiyah, n.d.), pp. 5–12.

[54]*Ibid.*

[55]Siddique and Kassim, *op. cit.*, pp. 135–136.

[56]For details see, Ahmad, "University Education . . .", *op. cit.*, pp. 172–174; Siddique and Kassim, *op. cit.*, pp. 134–139.

[57]It later became Prophet Muhammad's (peace be upon him) Birthday Memorial Scholarship Fund Board.

[58]Zoohri, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

[59]Siddique, *op. cit.*, p. 315.

[60]*Ibid.*

[61]*Constitution of Singapore*, Article 6; Ibrahim, *op. cit.*, pp. 12–13; Siddique, *op. cit.*

[62]Such as quota system in job allocation, reservation of land for the Malays, etc. See M. Leifer, "Communal Violence in Singapore", *Asian Survey*, Vol. iv, No. 10, October 1964, p. 1120.

[63]For details about the opposition, see for instance, Ibrahim, *op. cit.*, pp. 62–72. Furthermore, the merger agreement signed in July 1963, specifically stipulated that special privileges enjoyed by the Malays in the Federation should not extend to Singapore when the new Federation came into being. See Leifer, *op. cit.*, p. 1118.

[64]*60th Annivasary*, *op. cit.*, p. 76.

[65]For various interpretations leading to the separation, see for instance, J.N. Parmer, "Malaysia 1965: Challenging the Terms of 1957", *Asian Survey*, Vol. vi, No. 2, February 1966, pp. 111–117; R.S. Milne, "Singapore's Exit from Malaysia: the Consequences of Ambiguity", *Asian Survey*, Vol. vi, No. 3, March 1966, pp. 175–184; J. Grossholtz, "An Exploration of Malaysian Meanings", *Asian Survey*, Vol. vi, No. 4, April 1966, pp. 227–240.

[66]Kassim, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

[67]Hussain, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

[68]Chee, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

[69]S.S. Bedlington, "Political Integration and the Singapore Malay Community", *Journal of the Historical Society*, University of Singapore, 1971, p. 53.

[70]Siddique, *op. cit.*, p. 315.

[71]Hussain, *op. cit.*, pp. 70–71.

[72] *Muslim Converts' Association of Singapore: From then till Now*, a documentary printed for the author on request. n.d.

[73] M. Salleh. "Aspects of Dakwah in Singapore", *Sedar*, 1977, pp. 19–25; W.R. Abdullah, *The Call to Islam: A Contemporary Perspective* (Singapore: The Muslim Converts' Association, 1990), pp. 1–14.

[74] *From then till Now*, *op. cit.*

[75] Zoohri, *op. cit.*, pp. 33–34.

[76] Zoohri, *op. cit.*, pp. 34–49. J. Tan, "Joint Government-Malay community Efforts to Improve Malay Educational Achievement in Singapore", *Comparative Education*, Vol. xxxi, No. 2, 1995, pp. 339–353.

[77] Zoohri, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

[78] AMP, *Factors Affecting Malay/Muslim Pupils' Performance in Education* (Singapore: AMP, 1995), p. 4.